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Abstract The medical assessments of criminal responsi-
bility and competence to consent to treatment are per-
formed, developed and debated in distinct domains. In this
paper I try to connect these domains by exploring the
similarities and differences between both assessments. In
my view, in both assessments a decision-making process is
evaluated in relation to the possible influence of a mental
disorder on this process. I will argue that, in spite of the
relevance of the differences, both practices could benefit
from the recognition of this similarity. For cooperative
research could be developed directed at elucidating exactly
how various mental disturbances can affect decision-mak-
ing processes.
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Introduction
Assessments of criminal responsibility and assessments of
competence to consent to treatment are important medical
practices. In general they are performed, developed and
debated in distinct domains. The assessment of criminal
responsibility1 is a task usually performed by specifically
trained forensic psychiatrists within a legal context
(Gutheil 2005; Simon 2005). The evaluation of compe-
tence, on the other hand, is the common medical practice of
assessing a patient’s ability to consent to treatment, usually
performed in a medical setting (Appelbaum 2007).2 This
paper intends to bring these two practices and the discus-
sions surrounding them together by exploring similarities
and differences between these assessments. Meanwhile, the
main goal of the paper is to identify relevant similarities
that could guide further research.
In my view, a similarity of both assessments (of adults) is
that a decision-making process is evaluated in relation to the
possible presence and influence of a mental disturbance. In
general, assessing a decision-making process may, of
course, also take place without any connection to mental
disorder. For instance, one might want to assess a decision-
making process in a company (see Hodgkinson and Starbuck
2008). This kind of decision-making, however, is not the
topic of this paper. The paper focuses on the assessment of
decision-making processes in the medical domain with
respect to treatment options or legally relevant behavior.
Recognizing a link between both assessments in principle
opens the possibility of cooperation and a fruitful exchange
between the two areas of expertise, at the level of training,
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1 In this paper I use the term ‘‘criminal responsibility’’ (see also
Eastman and Campbell 2006). An alternative term could be ‘insanity’
(or ‘legal accountability’). Within the context of forensic assessment
they are often used synonymously (see, e.g. Gutheil 2005, p. 345).
Meanwhile, there is some controversy whether forensic practitioners
should in fact state something about the defendant being (not)
responsible (see Sect. 4 on conceptual unclarity in forensic assess-
ment). In this paper I do not intend to take an explicit position on the
controversy. I use the term ‘criminal responsibility’ because it is
usually connected to the relevant forensic assessment.
2 I will not make a distinction between the terms ‘competence’ and
(decision-making) ‘capacity’. Cf. Appelbaum (2007, p. 1834): ‘‘The
terms ‘‘competence’’ and ‘‘capacity’’ are used interchangeably in this
article, since the oft-cited distinctions between them—competence is
said to refer to legal judgments, and capacity to clinical ones—are not
consistently reflected in either legal or medical usage.’’
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developing guidelines and research. At the same time, sig-
nificant differences between the two practices exist, which
are relevant to further research as well.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 I will
briefly introduce the concept of decision-making and the
different components that have been distinguished in the
process of decision-making. In Sects. 3 and 4 I will discuss
the assessments of competence and criminal responsibility
in terms of an evaluation of decision-making processes in
relation to a mental disturbance. I will also discuss to what
extent both assessments face conceptual and operational
difficulties. In Sect. 5 I will articulate and explore some
important differences between both types of assessment.
Yet, within the framework of this paper, I will not be able
to provide an exhaustive account of the differences. In
Sect. 6 I will, tentatively, discuss implications and oppor-
tunities for further research on both assessments.
Decision-making
It is hard to exactly define decision-making (see, e.g.,
Bermudez 2009). One way to conceive of decisions is
presented by Clarke (2007, p. 391): ‘‘When one makes a
decision, one actively forms an intention to perform an
action of a certain type.’’ In this conception of decision, as
in many philosophical accounts of decision-making, the
concept of intention is central (see also Kalenscher and
Tobler 2008). Another way to approach decision-making is
by recognizing three different phases in the process (Kalis
et al. 2008). The first phase is the generation of options, the
second phase is the selection of options, and the third phase
is the initiation of action. Options are understood here as
consisting of both these elements: being a possible action,
and having an affective value for the person concerned.
Kalis et al. (2008) emphasize that the first phase, the
generation of options, has been neglected in research on
decision-making. Interestingly, they link specific mental
disorders to problems that may occur in each of the phases
of decision-making. An example of a problem in one of the
phases is apathy. Perhaps this condition could be under-
stood as a state entailing hypogeneration of options. In
contrast, in a manic episode, hypergeneration of options
might occur (Kalis et al. 2008). A problem in the second
phase, option selection, could occur in conditions like
impulsivity. In such a condition there is a lack of control,
which hampers the selection of the (right) option. Impul-
sivity could also affect the third stage of decision-making:
too early initiation of action.
Whereas the assessment of competence is usually linked
to decision making—decision-making capacity being
almost synonymous with competence (Charland 2008)—
the assessment of criminal responsibility is not usually
understood in these terms. In this paper, however, I will,
tentatively, understand both assessments from the per-
spective of decision-making (see Sects. 3 and 4). In this
respect, the approach chosen by Kalis et al. (2008) is
interesting because of the explicit link between mental
disorders and problems in specific phases of decision-
making. In Sects. 3, 4 and 6, I will briefly return to their
proposal.
Competence
The assessment of competence
As a general principle, doctors are required by law and
ethics to obtain the informed consent of their patients
before starting treatment.3 Valid informed consent is only
obtainable in case the appropriate information has been
disclosed to a competent patient who is permitted to make a
voluntary choice (Paterick et al. 2008). Generally, four
abilities are considered requirements for decision-making
capacity. Firstly, the ability to express a choice, secondly,
the ability to understand the relevant information, thirdly,
the ability to appreciate one’s situation and the conse-
quences of the options, and finally, the ability to reason
about treatment choices (Simon 2005; Appelbaum 2007).
The fact that competence is crucial in any consent to
treatment implies that physicians must always be aware of
the possibility that patients may in fact have impaired
decision-making capacity. It also implies that physicians
must be skilled at evaluating that possibility. The clinical
importance of this skill is underlined by the fact that
patients lacking this capacity are commonly found in
medical and surgical inpatient units (Appelbaum 2007).
Recently, Owen et al. (2008) found that lack of mental
capacity to make decisions about treatment is also common
(60%) in people admitted to a psychiatric hospital.
If a patient lacks the competence to make a decision
about treatment, this prompts action on the part of the
doctor, namely to seek a substitute decision-maker (see
also Nicholson et al. 2008; Simon 2005).4 Clearly, by
assigning a substitute decision maker, no ‘ideal’ situation is
created; although valuable for the medical process, the
substitute decision-maker is no more than, indeed, a sub-
stitute for a real autonomous decision by the patient him or
herself (see also Buchanan and Brock 2004).
3 Certain exceptions (see Simon 2005) exist to the requirement of
informed consent, the most common being a case of emergency while
the patient is unable to consent to treatment.
4 See Jonsen et al. (2006, especially pp. 90–91, 114) for substitute
decision-making in relation to ‘‘best interest’’. See Kopelman (2007)




Mental disorder and competence
It is important to note the relationship between impairment
of competence and mental disturbance or disorder. Ap-
pelbaum (2007, p. 1835) says: ‘‘Any diagnosis or treatment
that compromises mentation may be associated with
incompetence.’’ I will not go into detail about how,
exactly, we should understand mental disorder. There is
much debate on how to conceive of mental disorders
conceptually (see, e.g., Bolton 2008; Thornton 2007). In
my perception, given the medical context of both assess-
ments, the term mental disorder could be used. I assume
however that not all cases of incompetence can be classi-
fied in terms of mental disorders like psychosis, or major
depression. But mental disturbances that lead to incom-
petence will generally be found in, e.g., the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association 1994).5 Others might prefer
the term ‘mental dysfunction’ to ‘mental disorder’. In my
view, however, while the term dysfunction might be more
appropriate in (neuro)cognitive research, within the med-
ical domain of both assessments, the term disorder is more
appropriate.
The central point is that conditions compromising
mentation (Appelbaum 2007) are the kind of conditions
potentially associated with incompetence. According to
Nicholson et al. (2008), explaining the Mental Capacity
Act (United Kingdom 2005), lack of competence requires
impairment of functioning of mind or brain (for example
cognitive impairment, mental disorder, delirium, or intox-
ication). I also take him to mean that there has to be some
sort of mental disorder or disturbance, for if an intoxication
does not lead to any mental disturbance, there is, in my
view, no way it will influence competence. Put otherwise,
in general, a person without any mental disturbance is
considered competent to make a decision on treatment
options, as long as the relevant information has been pro-
vided (and there are no external factors such as a threat).
The relation with mental disorder could also explain
why psychiatric consultation may be helpful in ‘‘particu-
larly complex cases’’ of assessments of competence (Ap-
pelbaum 2008, p. 1837). As an analogy, many physicians
can treat urinary tract infections, but in ‘particularly
complex cases’ it is the urologist who may be helpful. This
is not because urologists just happen to be skilled in
‘complicated’ urinary tract infections, but because the
urinary tract and its disorders are the remit of the urolog-
ical specialty. Similarly, there is an intricate relationship
between psychiatry and impairment of decision making
capacity: such incapacity arises in cases of mental disor-
der, which in medical practice is the remit of the psychi-
atric specialty.
Meanwhile, it is of equal importance to emphasize that
people may be perfectly competent with respect to deci-
sions about their treatment while suffering from a (severe)
mental disorder. As Appelbaum (2007, p. 1835) puts it, ‘‘no
diagnosis in which consciousness is retained is invariably
predictive of incapacity.’’ For instance, studies have found
that more than half—but not all—of the patients with mild-
to-moderate dementia may have impaired decision-making
capacity (Appelbaum 2007). And this, of course, is what
calls for special expertise on the part of physicians in
general and the consultant psychiatrist in particular. For it
is not (just) about establishing the presence of a mental
disorder or disturbance, but about evaluating a decision
process in relation to the (possible) presence and influence
of a mental disorder.
Clarity of the assessment
Given the central role of the assessment of competence in
all medical treatment, it is disturbing that the performance
of capacity assessments is ‘‘often suboptimal’’ (Appelbaum
2007). There are, at least, two major problems. First,
physicians are frequently unaware of a patient’s incapacity
for decision-making. Second, when incapacity is suspected,
doctors may not know which standard to apply. Hurst et al.
(2007) found that doctors report uncertain or impaired
decision-making capacity as a very frequently encountered
ethical difficulty in clinical practice. In fact, there is no
gold standard that tells a physician exactly what compe-
tence is. According to Simon (2005, p. 3982), ‘‘no firmly
established criteria exist for determining a patient’s com-
petence.’’ Yet, various instruments, like the MacArthur
scale (Grisso et al. 1997), have turned out to be of practical
help in the evaluation process of competence (see Jeste
et al. 2007; Owen et al. 2008).
In fact, there is not only a lack of practical guidelines,
but there remains conceptual unclarity how to basically
understand decision-making capacity. This is illustrated by
a comment on Appelbaum (2007) by Spike (2008). Ap-
pelbaum mentioned that the decision being ‘reasonable’ is
a criterion for competence. Spike (2008, p. 644), however,
says that decision-making capacity ‘‘has more to do with
acting characteristically than with acting reasonably.’’
Spike’s comment makes at least some sense to me: it seems
to be important that it is the patient’s own choice, consis-
tent with who he or she is. And one way of putting this
might be to say he or she is choosing ‘characteristically’.
However, the problem is that Appelbaum’s (2008, p. 644)
reply also makes sense: ‘‘Although Spike would favor
application of a consistency standard rather than reasoning,
5 As far as the DSM-IV is concerned some relevant disorders could
perhaps be classified as ‘‘293.9 Mental Disorder NOS Due to…[Indi-
cate the General Medical Condition]’’.
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this is not generally accepted—for good reason. Consis-
tency with past behavior is a difficult determination,
especially for unprecedented decisions (e.g., amputation);
moreover, a consistency standard risks denying patients the
right to choose differently today than they have in the
past.’’ So, there remain pressing issues not only with
respect to practical guidelines, but also concerning the
conceptual elucidation of what competence is actually
about (see also Welie 2008).
In this section, I have proposed that assessments of
competence can, in general, be conceived of as assessments
of decision-making processes in relation to the possible
presence and influence of a mental disorder. Considering
the three phases of decision-making (Kalis et al. 2008), the
emphasis in assessments of competence, in general, will be
on the capacity of option selection. The generation of
options seems to be of less importance, since within the
medical setting the options have often already been selected
by the doctor or other healthcare worker. The actual initi-
ation of action, in my view, will also be of less importance.
Forensic assessment of criminal responsibility
The nature of the assessment
According to Gutheil (2005, p. 357), the ‘‘core of the
insanity issue’’ in forensic psychiatry is the ‘‘application of
legal (usually statutory) criteria to a mental condition in a
defendant at the time of the act in question to determine
whether he or she should be held responsible’’. A common
way to understand the forensic role, using other terms, is by
referring to the fact that the judicial system requires two
elements to be able to hold a person accountable for a
criminal offence: the criminal act as such (actus reus) and
intent (mens rea, latin for ‘‘guilty mind’’). (see, e.g., Ze-
mishlany and Melamed 2006; Morse 2007). As Zemishlany
and Melamed (2006) put it: ‘‘A person who, as a result of
severe mental disease or defect, is not able to appreciate the
nature and quality of his or her acts is not held responsible
for committing them.’’ This judicial approach is also linked
to a famous case from the British courts (1843), where
rules were developed to guide an insanity defense, known
as ‘‘the M’Naghten rules’’ (Simon 2005).
The rules can be phrased (Elliott 1996, p. 11) as, ‘‘at the
time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from the disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know what he
was doing was wrong.’’ M’Naghten is, as Elliott (1996, p.
10) says, ‘‘by far the most influential, the most widely
quoted, and the most roundly criticized test of legal
insanity’’. An important point of criticism has been that it
focuses on ‘reason’ and cognitive capability too much. For
mood and affect are also important factors (Elliott 1996,
pp. 11–12).6 Another point of criticism is that the nature of
the knowledge is not clear. For instance: is it knowledge
about the fact that the law says that the act is wrong, or is it
about moral wrongness? Meanwhile, it has been the stan-
dard for the defense of insanity in most Anglo-American
jurisdictions.7
Problems concerning the assessment
For various reasons the forensic psychiatrist’s task is
considered complicated (Gutheil 2005). It is generally
recognized that the fact that the psychiatrist is operating on
interdisciplinary territory is closely related to the difficul-
ties encountered. According to Van Marle and Van der
Kroft (2007, p. 511), ‘‘the difficulty in understanding the
essence of forensic psychiatry is that it is a medical pro-
fession within the multidisciplinary field of criminal jus-
tice, social control and empirical sciences within a social
context.’’
In addition, what makes the forensic psychiatrist’s task
hard is that the (conceptual) framework within which he or
she works is not completely clear (see Gutheil 2005; Simon
2005). A significant area of unclarity concerns the ‘ultimate
question’. Should forensic psychiatrists express their view
whether the defendant is actually responsible (or not
responsible) for the act? Some have suggested that psy-
chiatrists should not make the inference that the person is
responsible, because it is a ‘fact’ and psychiatrists should
not be ‘fact-finders’ (Gutheil 2005). Psychiatrists, then,
should say no more than: ‘‘The defendant lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act’’, without
expressing an explicit view on the ‘ultimate issue’ of moral
responsibility. Others have argued that ‘‘all forensic evi-
dence is opinion anyway’’ (Gutheil 2005, p. 355), and that
juries are explicitly instructed to deal with forensic evi-
dence as such.
Another thorny issue is whether it is the psychiatrist’s
task to determine whether the committed act was per-
formed ‘freely’. Some consider freedom inescapable to
the forensic psychiatrist’s assessment (Luthe and Ro¨sler
2004; Meynen 2009). Others argue that the concept of
free will should be avoided by forensic practitioners,
because the law itself does not require ‘free will’ in order
to be able to hold a person responsible (Morse 2007).
According to Morse, therefore, the concept of freedom or
6 It has also been argued that the role of emotions in competence has
not received due attention (Charland 2008).
7 See also Eastman and Campbell (2006) on neuroscience and legal
determination of criminal responsibility.
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free will is irrelevant to the forensic task, and using the
term would only spawn confusion. More precisely, there
is concern that forensic psychiatrists may get entangled
in metaphysical issues of free will and determinism
(Stone 2008). Felthous (2008) has recently proposed
dropping the word ‘free’ in relation to forensic work, and
to focus on the concept of will (and not on free will).
On a more practical level, there is at present no instru-
ment or (gold) standard to help the forensic practitioner in
his or her task (Henderson 2005; Simon 2005). Henderson
(2005) even appears to doubt its feasibility.
Decision-making and mental disorder
In my view, the assessment of criminal responsibility or
‘insanity’ could also be understood in terms of the influ-
ence of a mental disorder on a specific decision-making
process (the process that led to the act). As Buchanan
(2000, p. 80) says: ‘‘If psychiatric conditions are to be
grounds for exculpation, they must impair the sufferer’s
ability to choose’’ (see also Adshead et al. 2008).8 I would
propose to understand choosing in terms of decision-
making. There may be numerous reasons why a person
cannot be held accountable for an act, but it is the forensic
psychiatrist’s task as a medical specialist to relate the
decision-process that led up to the act to the possible
influence of a mental disorder—why would the courts
otherwise ask psychiatrists to make these assessments?
Surely, in some cases no decision may have been made
before the act. But if a forensic psychiatrist concludes that
no decision took place before the act, this usually will also
be valuable information to the court. Simon (2005), for
instance, mentions several exculpatory and mitigating
conditions in forensic psychiatry, like automatisms. A
(classic) exculpatory example is sleepwalking. In such
states actions occur ‘‘without will, purpose, or reasoned
intention.’’ (Simon 2005, p. 3985) I would argue that in
these conditions of parasomnia (states of lowered con-
sciousness, see also Elliott 1996, p. 12) there is no (real)
decision-making process leading to the act. In such cases it
may be very relevant to a jury that the forensic practitioner
reports that the act was committed without a (real) deci-
sion-making process.
I propose to view the forensic task basically as con-
sisting of three components: first, assessing whether a
mental disturbance was present at the time of the act,
second, assessing the decision-making process that led up
to the act, and, third, assessing whether the decision-
making process was decisively influenced by the mental
disorder (see also Morse 2007). In fact, these three ele-
ments are not completely distinct activities; there is a
practical intertwinement. For assessing the decision-mak-
ing process can provide information about the presence of a
mental disorder. If a person tells the forensic practitioner
that he hit his neighbor because he thought the neighbor
was spying on him day and night and transferring infor-
mation to the CIA, this may give information about the
presence of a mental disorder, and also about its influence
on the legally relevant act.
Distinguishing the three phases of decision-making
(Kalis et al. 2008, see Sect. 2) can also be relevant to
criminal responsibility. In my view, to a greater degree
than in assessments of competence, the generation of
options is relevant. For instance, did a delusion decisively
influence the options perceived/generated by the defen-
dant? In the case of making a decision about treatment
options, these options are given (by the doctor), while in
‘real life’ situations there are usually no fixed options. The
other two phases are also relevant: how did a person select
an option (perhaps delusions or cognitive impairments
influenced the selection), and were there problems initiat-
ing (or inhibiting) an action (this might relate to impulse
control problems)?
Up till now I have tried to bring forward a specific
similarity between the medical assessments of competence
and criminal responsibility. In my view, they have in
common that they evaluate a decision-making process in
relation to the possible influence of a mental disorder. Both
assessments are, in addition, related to normative concepts:
either the competence to choose between treatment options,
or the responsibility for one’s actions. Still, the practices of
assessing competence and criminal responsibility differ in
many relevant respects. In the next section I will address
what I consider important differences—although the list is
not meant to be exhaustive.
On the differences between both assessments
The differences between the forensic assessment of crim-
inal responsibility and the assessment of competence to
consent to treatment are many. In general, of course, they
are related to the fact that forensic assessments are per-
formed in a juridical environment and related to a legally
relevant act, while the assessment of competence is per-
formed in a medical environment related to choosing a
treatment option. The differences also explain, to a certain
extent, why both assessments are discussed and studied in
separate domains. Although the differences are undeniable,
I will also show how some of the differences could be
bridged.
8 Speaking about the forensic assessment in terms of assessing the
‘decision-making’ of the defendant, as I do, is not new (see e.g.
Buchanan 2008 on Felthous, and Beauregard 2007).
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Responsibility versus autonomy
The forensic psychiatrist’s task is to assess whether the
person who performed a legally relevant act can be held
accountable, or responsible for this act (see above in
Sect. 4 for hesitations about this view, Gutheil 2005).
Meanwhile, the central concept behind decision-making
capacity is considered to be autonomy (see, e.g., Dekkers
2001). For the significance of competence is linked to the
fact that we value a person’s autonomy (Welie and Welie
2001). We want, as Owen et al. (2008) say, ‘‘an individ-
ual’s autonomous decisions relating to the acceptance and
refusal of medical treatment [to] be respected.’’ So, as it
seems, we are confronted with the difference between the
concepts of ‘responsibility’ (in assessments of criminal
responsibility) and ‘autonomy’ (in assessments of
competence).
Yet, although at first glance there seems to be a differ-
ence, it turns out that competence too could be understood
in terms of responsibility. This is shown by Welie and
Welie (2001, p. 129). They say that ‘‘it is generally
believed that patients (…) carry final responsibility for
their own health care (or at least the acceptance or refusal
thereof). If a patient refuses much needed medical care, no
one but the patient is responsible for that decision. Patients
have a right to be left alone. But we can only hold persons
responsible if they could have made a different decision, if
they were free and able to reach a different decision.
Competence is the patient’s ability to make a choice about
the various medical interventions offered to her by the
caregiver, and to bear accountability for that choice.’’ So,
competence, apparently, can be understood in terms of
responsibility and accountability. Therefore, although at
first sight there may be a conceptual difference between
responsibility (in forensic assessment) and autonomy (in
assessment of competence), both can be expressed in terms
of responsibility. In other words, the conceptual gap, as it
appears, can be bridged.
Act versus choice
Forensic practice pertains to a criminal act, while assessing
competence pertains to a choice about medical treatment.
Again, at first glance, this might seem a clear difference.
But, in my view, there are three things we should consider.
Firstly, one of the criteria for competence to consent to
treatment is to be able to communicate or to express a
choice. This is an act. Secondly, making a decision can also
be considered an act. As Buchanan and Brock (2004, p. 18)
put it: ‘‘Competence is competence for some task, com-
petence to do something. The concern here is with com-
petence to perform the task of making a decision.’’ This is
in line with Beauchamp and Childress (2001, p. 70) who
state: ‘‘A single core meaning of the word competence
applies in all contexts. That meaning is ‘‘the ability to
perform a task’’. Third, consider a case of perjury. In this
case the criminal act can be no more than the (false) answer
‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’. Crimes do not always take a lot of ‘action’.
So, although there is a difference between act and choice,
this difference can also, to some extent, be bridged.
Unlawful (act) versus legal (choice)
In forensic work the central act of which the decision-
making process has to be assessed, is unlawful. In the case
of assessing competence, the treatment options are, in
principle, all legal and admissible. The doctor is not
allowed to propose illegal medical options. Meanwhile, I
would argue, patients have to be able to appreciate the
situation, and value the consequences, which can very well
imply an ethical dimension of these consequences, for
instance, the consequences for loved ones. In general, when
making (major) decisions in life (like some decisions about
medical treatment), it is important to have an understand-
ing of the ethical dimension of the options and also their
‘lawfulness’. Still, forensic assessment, in Simon’s view
(2005), is explicitly about assessing whether there is ‘‘a
lack of knowledge of the nature or wrongfulness of the
act’’. So (understanding) the unlawful nature of the act
could, then, be considered specific for forensic work.9
Initiated by a legal authority versus treating physician
This difference is closely related to the kind of act/choice
of which the decision-making process is central to the
examination. In forensic assessment it is a legally relevant
act, while in assessment of competence it is (in the standard
case) a choice about medical treatment. From this differ-
ence of context and domain do stem a lot of pitfalls in
forensic work (see Gutheil 2005). For instance, confiden-
tiality, a core characteristic of the usual doctor patient-
relationship, does not apply in the same way in the forensic
setting. This implies, on the part of the forensic practi-
tioner, the obligation to make sure that the defendant is
fully aware of the actual kind of relationship there is. Yet,
this difference does not undermine the view that the
assessment itself is about a decision-making process in
relation to mental disorder.
9 In principle, of course, during the legal procedures it may turn out
that an act was not unlawful after all. In addition, much more can be
said about the ‘‘wrongfulness’’ of the act. I do think, however, that
there is some prima facie difference in this respect between forensic
assessment and evaluation of competence, and it is just common sense
that it has to be addressed in (forensic) training.
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‘Main outcome’: punishment versus medical procedure
The fact that the outcome of forensic assessment may
(indirectly) result in legal punishment is a clear difference
compared to the assessment of competence, where it is
about a medical procedure. (The possibility of being misled
by the examinee in forensic work may primarily have to do
with this feature of forensic work.) But the consequences,
in my view, do not constitute a fundamental difference. For
both assessments are not basically about imposing pun-
ishment or providing treatment, but about evaluating the
decision-making process that led up to the act/choice.
Retrospective versus current/prospective
Forensic assessment is an evaluation in retrospect—an
important complication of this kind of assessment. The act
has been committed and the assessment is about the deci-
sion-process that led up to the act. In contrast, in the
assessment of competence the choice is (usually) currently
being made, or it will be made soon. This means that in
forensic assessments specific skills are required to reliably
assess a decision-making process in retrospect.
As an additional difference it can be mentioned that the
two practices, in general, encounter different mental dis-
orders. In forensic assessment ‘insanity’ is usually asso-
ciated with psychotic phenomena (Rogers and Sewell
1999; Elliott 1996, p. 12). Questions about competence, on
the other hand, are often related to cognitive impairment
due to dementia and other organic syndromes (see Ray-
mont et al. 2004, also Buchanan and Brock 2004, p. 1,
Candilis et al. 2008).
So, there are important differences. Considering these
mainly shows the complexity of the forensic task: operat-
ing as a medical expert in legal territory, making an
assessment in retrospect about a non-medical (even
unlawful) act. These complexities certainly have their
bearings on research aimed at elucidating the forensic task
of assessing criminal responsibility. Yet, and this is an
important point, the differences between both assessments
do not falsify relevant similarities as identified previously.
Within the framework of this paper, I will not further
address these differences or their consequences for further
research. I will focus on the opportunities for both
assessments if they are approached from their common
ground.
Implications and opportunities
Although there are undeniable differences between both
assessments, there is also significant common ground. Both
are assessments of decision-making processes and the
possible influence of mental disorder on these processes.
Both, in addition, are ‘decision-specific’ (Buchanan and
Brock 2004, p. 22): they refer to a specific (unlawful) act or
(medical) choice. Finally, both assessments are considered
to be linked to related normative concepts like autonomy
and responsibility.
The first practical implication of their similarity is that
research on criminal responsibility could, in principle,
benefit from the approach chosen by research on compe-
tence. The progress that has been made in finding at least
some consensus with respect to a set of criteria (Appel-
baum 2007) and the development of a scale (MacArthur),10
and also practical research (like Owen et al. 2008), could
be a useful example for research on criminal responsibility.
Relevant aspects of this approach can be subsumed, in my
view, under the term ‘empirical ethics’.
It may be hard to precisely define empirical ethics. In
general, empirical ethics strives, alongside conceptual
analysis, to obtain relevant empirical data. It can do so via
different methods, for example: observations, interviews
and questionnaires (Eastman and Starling 2006; Widder-
shoven et al. 2008). Empirical ethics has proven to be a
possible approach to many normative health issues, like
questions about end-of life decisions, and also competence
and informed consent (Widdershoven et al. 2008; Eastman
and Starling 2006). Widdershoven et al. (2008, p. 19)
understand empirical ethics as follows: ‘‘We suggest that
for an enterprise to be called empirical medical ethics it
must include ethical (normative) analysis. And to be
empirical it must involve the systematic collection of
data.’’ They emphasize the interaction between both pro-
cesses, which they call an interactive cycle. Another
important characteristic of empirical ethics is that it is
familiar with the interface of medicine and law (Eastman
and Starling 2006; Welie 2008). To be sure, the approach
in research on competence has not eliminated all problems
and it has not led to a general consensus (Welie 2008).
Also, on a meta-ethical level, one could ask questions
about exactly how empirical data and ethics can be inte-
grated—integrating ‘is’ and ‘ought’ issues (Van der Scheer
and Widdershoven 2004). Yet, my proposal is not meant to
eliminate all possible conceptual problems, but to suggest
an approach to criminal responsibility that has led to some
conceptual and practical elucidation with respect to
competence.
In addition to empirical ethics, there is, in my view,
another approach that might be helpful to both assessments.
This is research on decision-making processes in relation to
specific mental disorder. Recently cognitive
10 Many scales have been developed. For an overview, see Vellinga
et al. 2004.
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(neuro)scientists have become interested in linking disor-
ders of decision-making to specific mental disorders
(Bechara 2005; Kalis et al. 2008; Paulus 2007). An
example is the study on dysregulation of decision-making
in specific mental disorders by Cattapan-Ludewig et al.
(2008). They found (using a two-choice prediction task)
that decision-making behavior of first-episode schizophre-
nia patients was characterized by a high degree of dys-
regulation. Another example is the study by Sevy et al.
(2007). They observed widespread impairments in several
cognitive domains and emotion-based decision-making in
schizophrenia (in relation to the use of cannabis). A
slightly different design, but still linking a specific mental
disorder to decision-making, was followed by Candilis
et al. (2008). They studied decision-making capacity in
schizophrenia and physically ill subjects. Importantly, they
not only found impaired decision-making in schizophrenia,
but also found that decision-making capacity was compa-
rable to comparison subjects in a large part of the schizo-
phrenia patients. This kind of research, specifically
addressing decision-making in relation to circumscribed
disorders, may also provide a way to proceed for research
on both assessments. The subdivision as proposed by Kalis
et al. (2008) (generation, selection, and initiation, see
Sect. 2), could provide an initial framework to approach
decision-making in psychopathology.
In fact, one of the main practical effects of conceiving of
both medical tasks in the way proposed is that it opens the
possibility of linking these empirical studies to concrete
questions on competence and criminal responsibility. Such
research could also help to optimize decision-making
capacity in the relevant disorders.
With respect to research it is important that both medical
practices are strongly embedded in legislation and regula-
tions which may differ from country to country. In forensic
work such differences include whether psychiatrists
explicitly state whether the defendant is accountable or not
(the ‘ultimate question’, see, e.g., Gutheil 2005). Yet, my
proposal to conceive of the forensic task as evaluating the
influence of a mental disorder on a specific decision-
making process, does not rely on assuming that the forensic
psychiatrist has to make a statement about criminal
responsibility.
With regard to competence, differences between coun-
tries may involve the explicit relationship between com-
petence and mental disorder or dysfunction. While the
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Nicholson et al. 2008) articu-
lates such a relationship, other conceptions of competence
may not express this connection (Vellinga 2006). Yet, even
if one would disagree that, on a conceptual level, incom-
petence necessarily involves a ‘mental disorder’, on a
practical level incompetence is related to (severe) mental
disorders (see, e.g., Vellinga 2006).
Conclusion
Decisions may be the most important things we make.
Assessing the process through which they come about may
be one of the most complicated jobs there is. Society, med-
icine and the law are especially interested in the exact pro-
cess that led up to a decision, when there are concerns about a
person’s autonomy and criminal responsibility. In such
cases, doctors (especially psychiatrists) may be asked to act
as experts in—as I tentatively propose to put it—assessing
the decision-making process and the possible influence of a
mental disorder on this process. This kind of assessment is
taken very seriously, and it may have serious consequences.
In spite of the differences between both evaluations, the
similarities justify, in my view, a cooperative effort on
conceptual and practical research on decision-making in
relation to mental disorder. Apart from doing further
(cooperative) research on these assessments, it may be wise
to train doctors in assessing (crucial) decision-making pro-
cesses in relation to the presence of mental disorder.
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